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September, 2010
(A version was published as cover story in an Indian Foreign Affairs Magazine: Diplomatist,
September 2010 http://www.diplomatist.com/dipo9th10/story_01.htm )
***
For decades, small countries in South Asia have had to rely on India for economic assistance
and the trade and transit outlets. Sometimes, it was not uncommon for them to feel Indian
leverage in matters related to national politics. For a long time, China had maintained a low key
approach to dealing with these small neighbors in South Asia. China’s new found prosperity, its
natural resources needs, and their pursuit to seek alternate maritime passages have all changed
the South Asian dynamics in a significant way. This thesis argues that both India and China are
much better off looking at these smaller neighbors as a land of opportunity rather than a
platform for rivalry. We begin with Nepal as an example.

With the enhanced growth and economic clout at the global stage, India and China are both
forging various individual bilateral economic linkages with the smaller South Asian neighbors.
A newly formed economic alliance between China and Sri Lanka to develop Hambantota port on
the southern tip of the island is the latest example. Another SAARC member Bangladesh is
collaborating with China to open a transportation outlet into Myanmar.

India is also courting Bangladesh for natural gas supplies and looking into its transportation
network within Bangladesh as a transit corridor to reach the north-eastern frontier states, and
perhaps beyond into Myanmar. Oil explorations, transit rights, hydro development, and seaport
access are other examples. So, a proposal from a transit corridor country like Nepal for a
trilateral economic cooperation with India and China should be welcomed as a natural
economic reality made possible by the unprecedented growth trajectories of the two rising
economic giants.

Introduction

Most of the 31 landlocked countries in the developing world are poor with very little economic
clout in the global market. Sandwiched between the two densely populated countries --China
and India, Nepal too faces common sets of issues: poverty, geographic ruggedness, and the lack
of the seaport access. To address the plights of these landlocked countries, the United Nations
took initiative in 2003 to convene the International Ministerial Conference of Landlocked and
Transit Developing Countries and Donor Countries and International Financial and Development
Institutions on Transit Transport Cooperation in Almaty, Kazakhstan, from 25-29 August 2003.
The Almaty Declaration had usual goals: secure access; reduce costs of imports; address
problems of delays and uncertainties in trade routes; develop adequate national networks. Some
of these goals have also been tied to the Millennium Poverty Reduction targets.

Despite global concerns about the seaport access and the transit costs of these landlocked
territories, each landlocked country faces its own set of geo-political realities, requiring a set of
appropriately crafted solutions. Many member countries of the South Asian Association for
Regional Cooperation (SAARC) organization are striking various bilateral cooperative linkages
as per their mutual economic interest, geographic landscape, and geo-political proximity.

Three-Way Cooperation

Nepal is no exception, and this essay urges all of us to think outside the box by way of a threeway cooperative agreement between Beijing, Kathmandu, and Delhi to take advantage of
Nepal’s geo-position as a transit corridor and other assets. In addition to making a case for
Nepal and its comparative advantages as a vital transit corridor, this thesis examines smaller
countries like Mongolia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, and Sri Lanka and their balancing acts against the
two rising super power neighbors.

The essay begins with some historical perspective.
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China vs India Debate

For decades, small countries in South Asia have had to rely on India for economic assistance and
the trade and transit outlets. Sometimes, it was not uncommon for them to feel Indian leverage
in matters related to national politics. For a long time, China had maintained a low key approach
to dealing with these small neighbors in South Asia. China’s new found prosperity, its natural
resources needs, and their pursuit to seek alternate maritime passages have all changed the South
Asian dynamics in a significant way. But, this thesis argues that both India and China are much
better off looking at these smaller neighbors as a land of opportunity rather than a platform for
rivalry. We begin with Nepal as an example.

With a vast and sparsely populated Tibetan territory and
an impenetrable Himalayan wall in the North, Nepal’s
interactions was mostly with its southern neighbor India
who also shares a 1700 KM long open border with
Nepal.

For decades, a respectable distance of co-

existence had been a norm between India and the Nepali
rulers. India’s engagement in Nepal’s internal politics began to deepen when the Maoist rebels
started a bloody insurgency against Nepal’s, according to the Maoists, “feudal power bases” that
included monarchy, Nepal’s new democratic Constitution of 1990, and the political parties.
Indian apprehension was further confounded by its own fast spreading Naxalite movement.
Finally after ten years of bloody war, India brokered a 12-point deal in Delhi between the
Maoists rebels and the political parties, which ultimately led to the removal of King Gyanendra
in 2005. Election for the Constituent Assembly followed, and the communist rebels surprisingly
took a 40 percent of the seats in the 601-member parliament; the Nepali monarchical rule was
formally abolished in December 2008.

After two years since election, the constitutional writing process is still in limbo, and
importantly, there is still no clear understanding over the number of the PLA fighters and their
integration into the Nepal Army. The formation of the paramilitary style Youth Communist

League (YCL) wing by the Maoist party and the numerous armed groups creating a serious law
and order situation across the country have added more complication.

Suddenly, India’s Nepal policy began to seem like a failure. The situation reached its climax in
the summer of 2009 when Prime Minister Pushpa Kamal Dahal or Prachanda --leader of the
Unified Communist Party of Nepal UCPN(M)— had to step down over his failed attempt to fire
the Commander in Chief General Katuwal. General Katuwal was a critique of the Maoists’ plan
of a wholesale integration of the PLA fighters into the Nepal Army. The resignation paved the
way for a new government led by Madhav Kumar Nepal of the Unified Marxist Leninist (UML).

At the same time, the latest Chinese interest on Nepal --series of delegations, official visits
between Beijing and Kathmandu, the gesture of economic aid, and the increased interaction
between the communist party leadership of Nepal and China-- began to be seen as an emerging
China factor. With the peace process delayed in several fronts, the Indian and Nepali newspapers
and the various intelligentsias also began framing events in Nepal as an India versus China game.
The latest revelation about the alleged vote-buying scandal involving a high level Maoist CA
member and a Chinese official and the tapping of the private phone conversation by a mysterious
third party have all fuelled many conspiracy theories. This is an example to show how a small
country like Nepal can suddenly fall on a China-versus-India trap.

Think Big

When examined closely, this type of rivalry over Nepal, perceived or real, seems so frivolous for
these two aspiring giants.

China, who just surpassed Japan to be the second largest economy in

the world and a new emerging auto-industry giant, is moving leaps and bounds on its
development trajectory. It would make more sense for them to be more interested in the
southern Asian markets than worry about how to engineer a political leverage over some parties
in Nepal. The world’s largest democracy --India, on the other hand, who is eager to enter the
space age and aspires to be a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, could
also exercise some caution while dealing with the internal affairs of a small country like Nepal.
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On the other hand, Nepali politicians are themselves mostly responsible for perpetuating such
paranoia. In fact, many Nepalis genuinely do appreciate India for its help in Nepal’s struggle for
democracy and the development aid.

Many still go to India for higher education. There is a

deep cultural affinity between the people of India and Nepal, and it goes back several centuries.
They celebrate the same festivals, and worship the same deities. Indians come to Nepal to pay
religious homage to famous temples such as Pashupati, Janaki Mandir, Lumbini, and Muktinath,
whereas for many Nepalis going on a pilgrimage to India’s Four Dhams (four holy pilgrimage
sites) is a lifelong dream. Similarly, Nepal’s Lumbini, the birthplace of the Buddha, holds a
special place in the hearts of 100 million Chinese Buddhists.

So how does Nepal chart a new direction and move forward? Foremost, the politicians should
pay more attention on how to harness the strength of Nepal’s two economic giant neighbors
instead of playing one against the other for petty political power gains at home. To that end, the
proposal in this essay recommends that China, Nepal, and India enter into a formal trilateral
economic cooperative agreement.

Both China and India are already forging various individual bilateral linkages with the smaller
South Asian neighbors. Notable is the newly formed economic alliance between China and Sri
Lanka to develop Hambantota port on the southern tip of the island. Another SAARC member
Bangladesh is collaborating with China to open a transportation outlet into Myanmar. India is
also courting Bangladesh for natural gas supplies and looking into its transportation network
within Bangladesh as a transit corridor to reach the north-eastern frontier states, and perhaps
beyond into Myanmar. These are just some select examples. Another landlocked country
Mongolia is moving towards economic independence by striking cooperative agreements with
both neighbors – Russia and China, and other countries like the US and some international
multinationals.

So, a proposal from Nepal for a bilateral and/or trilateral economic cooperation with India and
China should be welcomed as a sign of new economic reality made possible by the
unprecedented growth trajectories of the two rising economic giants. Will Nepal be able to

navigate out of its current conundrum? And if so, what kind of leverage does it have at its
disposal?

How can Nepal assure both India and China and help them ease their security concerns? These
questions have to be worked out carefully by sitting down with the two neighbors. But, with
some open mindedness from the giant neighbors, a mutually beneficial cooperative agreement
can be struck, especially given the fact that the two rising super powers of the world are just
separated by a long and thin corridor of Nepal.

Given the unsettled disputed border issues between China and India in the north-east and the
north-west frontiers, Nepal provides an excellent transit buffer for overland trading between the
two countries.

Three-Tier Diplomacy

Nepalis are aware of the rising economic prowess of China and India at the world stage, and they
also love to talk about the strategic location. But in order to translate this rhetoric into reality,
Nepali policymakers need to have a strategic vision, followed by a set of doable policies.

For such a vision, they need to make sure the regional politics are tied to their economic
development strategies, and that the small country like Nepal can promote interests that are
mutually beneficial for all parties involved. To that end, Nepal needs to persuade its two
neighbors

to sign

a

tri-lateral

agreement

–

the

Trans-Himalayan

Economic

Cooperation Agreement (THECA).

China’s South-Westward Move

With rising economic trade between China and India to the tune of US$60 billion per annum,
which is more than the Indian trade with the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
(SAARC) countries combined, a peaceful trade corridor in the middle would be a welcome relief
for the two aspiring superpowers.
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Numerous Indian banks are already operating in China; English-speaking Indian MBAs
and engineers are penetrating Chinese markets in an unprecedented way. And the idea of a
trans-Himalayan highway is not confined to romantic, visionary rhetoric. More than 80 per cent
of goods in the US are transported over land, after all. Such an arrangement will be a necessity
within a decade or two for the two Asian giants.

Also, the Chinese decision to move south-westward through the Tibetan plateau is highly
strategic. In addition to laying an eye on the southern
Asian market --Nepal, India, and Bangladesh, China is
interested in integrating Tibet and its vast western front,
Xinjiang, with the east coast.

Xinjiang is the largest

Chinese administrative division and borders Russia,
Mongolia,

Kazakhstan,

Kyrgyzstan,

Afghanistan, Pakistan and India.

Tajikistan,

It has abundant oil

reserves and is China's largest natural gas-producing region. Tibet shares borders with India,
Nepal, Bhutan and Myanmar. A province to the east of Tibet, Yunnan, shares borders with
Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam. Thus these Chinese southern frontier regions link China in one
continuous chain with Eurasia, central Asian Republics, South Asia and South East Asia.
Connecting these vast frontier provinces with the more prosperous east coast has become a
priority for China.

As part of its development strategy, China has developed an impressive network of highways
linking Beijing and Shanghai with 200 major cities and the provincial capitals, including a major
section through Lhasa already completed (see above map). The National Expressway Network
Plan of China has emulated US’s system with a so-called “five downs and the seven acrosses.”
The total length of the highway network in China is over 2 million Km and counting. Similar to
the US system, highways in the 200 series in China stretch from north to south and the 300 series
stretch from east to west (e.g., from Lhasa in Tibet through to Dandong in Liaoning province in
the north east China). China has completed much work to extend the Lhasa network westwards

running as a necklace parallel along the Chinese southern frontiers and the border countries like
Pakistan, India, Nepal, and Myanmar.

The dry port of Gyirong across from the
Nepal-China border is on this southern
section of the east-west stretch.

By

placing a dry port strategically across from
Nepal as a nodal point on its east-west
highway network, China is sending a signal to Nepal and to other southern neighbors India and
Bangladesh. In addition to investing US$200 million to upgrade the dry port, China is building
a road inside Nepal connecting the capital of Nepal to its border town not far from Gyirong (red
colored landscape on the border of Nepal). These enticing gestures should not be ignored, and
Nepali authority should proactively respond by establishing a more vibrant business consulate in
Gyirong.

With much of India’s north-east and the north-west regions under tension, India too needs to see
these developments taking place closer to China-Nepal borders as potential openings for
economic cooperation. By making Nepal a partner in this trilateral agreement, both China and
India stand to gain. As for Nepal, with some careful negotiation, it will benefit from the transit
revenues, not to mention job opportunities in other collaborative ventures in tourism, IT-related
outsourcing, agro-investment, hydro production, and modern transit infrastructure.

Rising Tibet

The sparsely populated but resource-laden Tibet Autonomous Region, the size of the Western
Europe landmass, holds special place in China’s southern drive. For example, Tibet holds close
to 30 percent of China’s fresh water reservoir (more than 100 b cb m underground and as much
on the surface), 30 percent of the forest and bio-diversity (10% of the total Chinese landmass),
massive river systems (20 major and 100 others), vast amount of minerals (100 mineral resources
and 3000 deposit sites), and hundreds of miles of grassy lands. For example, by taming the
rivers, the US converted vast expansive grassy lands in the Midwest (about 250 million acres)
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into productive farm lands and urban cities. China also plans to build 100 dams in Tibetan
plateau, which is going to change the Tibetan landscape in a significant way.

Some notable infrastructural development in Tibet are: 25,000 KM of major and minor highway
network, a spectacular railway line linking Beijing to Lhasa (4000KM), 1000 KM oil pipe line,
and there is more to come. This infrastructural development in Tibet also holds strategic value
for India. In 2009 alone, China invested about US$3 billion in Tibet, thus opening a potential
market for India as a supplier of “materials” for Chinese projects in Tibet. In some respect,
getting supplies from India through Nepal would be cheaper and easier for China than hauling it
from the east coast. Annual tourist volume of more than 5 million Chinese traveling to Lhasa
every year can also be a potential lucrative market for Nepal.

India’s Moves

This type of trilateral cooperative agreement between Beijing, Kathmandu, and Delhi should not
be seen as a substitute for SAARC, nor should it be seen as a China-versus-India card game.
OECD countries have forged their local cooperative treaties as per their national and regional
needs (e.g., North American Free Trade Agreement –NAFTA-- between Mexico, US, and
Canada). India too is constantly looking around to forge linkages with its neighbour on a
bilateral basis to fulfill its resource needs: Bhutan for hydro, Iran for pipeline, and Bangladesh
for natural gas.

Similarly, a visit to India by Myanmar’s Head of State, Senior
General Than Shwe from 25 to 29 July 2010 is equally significant. It
is worth noting that India and Myanmar share a 1600 KM border
much of it along the remote and volatile north-east frontier. Thus,
despite Myanmar‘s closeness to China, Indian leaders have decided to
focus on issues of common interests.

Similarly, despite some

outstanding border issues between China and India in the north-east
and the north-west borders, Nepal in the middle can still provide
peaceful transit outlets for the two countries.

Bangladesh Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina's visit to India in January 2010 is another example of
a shift in the geo-political thinking which holds a larger implication for the sub-regional
cooperation. The visit covered important issues such as: rail and road connectivity between
Bangladesh, Nepal and Bhutan; use of Chittagong and Mongla ports by India, Nepal and Bhutan;
inland water transports, and even collaborations on the use of Bangladesh transit to reach Indian
north-eastern territories.

Given the volatile situation on the western frontiers in Pakistan and Afghanistan, India clearly
wants Bangladesh’s cooperation to move to the east. That is, going beyond SAARC, India is
clearly looking to forge bilateral linkages with its neighbor to advance its economic interest.
Nepal could be another perfect corridor for India’s northward movement into China.

Other examples include India’s longtime desire to join the much coveted membership to the
Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum, and the Bay of Bengal Initiative for
Multisectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), of which Nepal is a member.
Another example is the Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement (CECA) between
Japan and India. Thus, the proposed THECA concept is also a natural outcome and the socioeconomic needs of the region.

India and China also had to come to some understanding about the two contentious issues: Tibet
and Sikkim. Following a visit to China by former Prime Minister Atal Bihari Vajpayee in 2003,
India accepted Chinese claim over Autonomous Region of Tibet, and similarly China has also
reciprocated by accepting Sikkim as a part of the Indian
territory.

There are other examples of the thawing relation between
China and India. Just a few days after the opening of the
high speed train system linking east China to Lhasa in 2006, the two nations reopened a transit
road in Sikkim at the Nathu Las pass. Even though it is currently operational only for a few
months a year with some limited commerce, the trading point has served as a new symbol of
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China-India relation. Despite Indian attempts to build some road networks in the north-east and
the north-west fronts, there are still some bones of contention between the two countries about
the border disputes in Kashmir (north-western front) and the volatile region of Arunachal
Pradesh (north-eastern front).

India Needs to Rethink

India needs to realize that there is little gain in creating economic stagnation in the region by
playing too much of the China-India security card. In fact, smaller countries like Pakistan, Sri
Lanka, Mongolia, Myanmar and even Nepal will all be succumbing to the gravitational pool of
China’s economic muscle power. If India wants to join that super power club, it needs to rethink
its regional diplomacy, including its role in Nepal. There will always be some parties, for
example in Nepal, eager to play the China-versus-India card for their personal gains. But a
largest democracy in the world with a global ambition needs to be farsighted and a bit
magnanimous towards its smaller neighbors.
With more than US$1.2 trillion export figures in 2009, China overtook Germany as a leading
exporter. Now, China is surpassing Japan as the second largest economy in the world. For
India, the export figure for the same year was about US$170 billion. In 2009, there were close to
25,000 foreign direct investment projects in China totaling close to US$80 billion. In 2010, 56
Indian companies were named among the world's 2,000 most powerful listed companies,
according to US magazine Forbes. As one of the largest trading partners themselves in South
Asia, the two giants are on their way to surpass US within the next 20 to 30 years.
Closer to home, smaller South Asian nations like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, Bangladesh, and Myanmar
are already coming into the Chinese economic folds through various bilateral economic
agreements.

Some examples include: China-Pakistan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) in 2006;

Chinese investment in Chashma Nuclear Power Plant, Pakistan; China-Bangladesh Most
Favored Nation (MFN) agreement of 1984; oil exploration right for China at Barakpuria,
Bangladesh; Chinese naval access to the Bangladeshi Chittagong port; Chinese investment in
Norochcholai Power Station, Bangladesh; China-Sri Lanka Joint Communiqué of 2005 to further
bilateral relations and provide each other MFN treatment; oil exploration right for China in the

Mannar basin in Sri Lanka; development of Hambantota port in Sri Lanka; and Special
Economic Zone for Chinese enterprises at Mirigama, near Colombo.
Following a visit to China by Prime Minister, Sheikh Hasina of Bangladesh, the two countries
came to an agreement to build a link road between Bangladesh and Myanmar. This project is to
be constructed in two phases –one inside Bangladesh and one in Myanmar- with an ultimate goal
of connecting it with Association of South East Asian Nations and China.
Even though some Indian analysts have begun to see this as a challenge to Indian hemispheric
influence, others concede this as being a new reality brought about by the nature of globalization.
Yet, many have begun to urge India to take a different approach in dealing with its smaller
neighbors in matters related to internal politics, border issues, development strategies, and trade.

The formation of SAARC itself has not adequately addressed many important agendas such as
the water sharing issues, opening of the export markets, and the issue such as the trade and
transit for a country like Nepal, just to name a few. Then there is an ongoing impasse between
India and Pakistan. As many of these smaller nations begin to reach out to form alternate
economic alliances, the traditional geographic rivalry between India and China will soon be a
thing of the past.

Can India afford to keep looking at China as a political rival and lose its neighbors through
attrition? Or, should India come to terms and see China as a vibrant collaborator? This China
versus India fault line will not help form a healthy relationship between India and its neighbors,
which is also not helpful for India’s own security. A freer and prosperous neighborhood is in the
best interest of India. The proposed THECA doctrine to bring China into a trilateral alliance is a
good test case for India.

Learning Lessons from Mongolia, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka

The Mongolian Independence
Mongolia had been historically under the Soviet Union’s sphere of influence. After the fall of the
Soviet empire in the 80’s, Mongolia began seeking an end to its unidirectional dependence on its
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northern neighbor, Russia. Things began to change dramatically when its resource-hungry
southern neighbor China started taking note of
Mongolia’s natural resource deposits: uranium,
gold, copper, and one of the largest coal
reserves near the Gobi desert bordering China.

On

Mongolia’s

part,

it

wants

Chinese

investment but desires no political interference
from its southern neighbor. Consequently, Mongolia has begun to reach out to other third parties
including the US. As a sign of its newly found “freedom”, Mongolia even participated in the
“coalition of the willing” campaign in Iraq. Russia has also begun to enter the fray offering its
own financial help of $7 million in military cooperation. The US has gone one step further
offering $285 million to renovate Mongolian railway system. Importantly, Mongolia has gone
beyond its border to forge economic alliances by signing a $5 billion agreement with the private
multinational companies to harness its Oyu Tolgoi mine near the Southern Gobi Desert.

Mongolia’s move in diversifying its political-economic linkages outside the traditional sphere –
the third-party doctrine-- is similar to what another landlocked country, Kazakhstan, has adopted.
The Mongolian “independence” effort is yet to play out in full, but what it shows is the
difficulties one faces by being a landlocked territory.

India’s Western Frontier: Pakistan
Another example of a bilateral economic
cooperation taking place in South Asia is
between China and Pakistan. China has been
investing heavily in
Pakistan’s south-west
province
Balochistan
borders

of
which
with

Afghanistan, Iran and the Persian Gulf. Well endowed with oil, gas,

copper, gold and coal reserves, Balochistan is becoming a vital interest for China, especially its
port city of Gadwar. China has invested about $200 million and has pledged another $1.6 billion
to upgrade the platforms at Gadwar port. Frustrated with the poor road infrastructure and in a
significant move, China has decided to build a road linking Gadwar to the capital of Balochistan
and thus putting the port city of Gadwar on the national highway grid of Pakistan. That is, China
is taking this southern outlet very seriously, but there are still many security issues related to the
regional conflict. Anyway, this only shows that mutually beneficial economic incentives can
overcome development obstacles. Nepal needs to do the same in its approach while dealing with
China and India. Again, the larger lesson is that mutually beneficial bilateral or trilateral
agreements are equally vital even within the framework of SAARC. Both China and India are
doing it, so can Nepal.

Furthermore, Afghanistan is sitting on a vast amount of natural resource deposits worth $3
trillion. It is inevitable that the bordered countries like China, Pakistan and even the US and
India will all have to strike a cooperative agreement to promote peace and prosperity in the
region, especially for the benefit of the Afghan people.

Sri Lanka’s Balancing Act
Nepal can learn a lesson from Sri Lanka and their
approach to economic diplomacy, especially in
dealing with India and China. A case in point is
the Chinese involvement in the development of
$1.5 billion Hambantota port (with a Chinese
credit line of $425 million). It was only ten years
ago when India had sent
troops to help the Sri Lankan Government quell the Tamil insurgency.
The Government of Sri Lanka knows it well, and has expressed their
gratitude by celebrating India’ Independence by remembering the fallen
Indian soldiers in Kotte. But, they are also smart not to put all the eggs
in one basket, given the economic opportunities provided by the
Chinese global economic expansion. Sri Lanka holds an important maritime passage and an
13

alternate transit route for a resource-hungry China. This island country is trying to cash it by
exerting its own “independence”, but not by playing a China versus India card. In another
brilliant move, Sri Lanka has approached Delhi to join hands to invest in Hambantota. This is
similar to what the underlying concept of the proposed THECA doctrine proposes – cooperation
not confrontation.

India needs to realize that there is little gain in creating economic stagnation in the region by
playing too much of the China-India security card. In fact, smaller countries like Pakistan, Sri
Lanka, Mongolia, Myanmar and even Nepal will all be succumbing to the gravitational pool of
China’s economic muscle power. If India wants to join that super power club, it needs to rethink
its regional diplomacy, including its role in Nepal. There will always be some parties, for
example in Nepal, eager to play the China-versus-India card for their personal gains. But a
largest democracy in the world with a global ambition needs to be farsighted and a bit
magnanimous towards its smaller neighbors.

Nepal’s Case and the Proposal

Nepal is aware of its potential in cash crops (coffee, spices, tea, herbs, biofuel), cultural and
recreational tourism, hydro, manpower pool, and the importance of the Himalayan water towers.
For example, by investing in fiber optics and IT parks equipped with physical facilities, water,
electricity and tax breaks, culturally friendly and beautiful Nepal can attract some portion of the
billions of dollars of outsourcing ventures in India and China. Thousands of MBAs and IT
engineer graduates of Nepal can find good paying jobs and can learn entrepreneurial skills from
Indian and Chinese partners. Multi-lane highways and railway lines through the Himalayas could
link the two economic giants. The THECA doctrine should spell out these collaborative ventures,
including the preservation of the trans-boundary eco-system. Nepal’s banking sector is already
poised to be a regional financial capital, and its private colleges will be reinvigorated by linkages
with educational institutions north and south of the border.

It is also worth noting that Nepal now ranks in the top five to ten in student population in the US
universities just behind countries like China, India, and South Korea. The Nepali intellectual

diaspora knowledge society in North America and Australia can invigorate such entrepreneurial
activities in Nepal just like what the Indian diaspora did for India. The Government of Nepal
should adopt a diaspora friendly VISA policy, including perhaps starting a debate regarding the
possibility of a dual citizenship.

The Security Concerns
In return for these economic opportunities and infrastructure development in Nepal, and as an
integral part of the THECA doctrine, Nepal should not hesitate to offer some peace of mind to its
neighbors. Chinese concern is the growing anti-China political
activities in Nepal. Keeping with the human rights charter of the
United Nations, peaceful demonstration in some designated
areas should be tolerable to the Chinese. The Nepal government
should also make sure that the monasteries in Nepal do not
violate their spiritual sanctity by being the centers of political activism. Furthermore, Nepal does
not have any such prohibition against anti-India, anti-U.S. or even anti-Nepal demonstrations.
This is simply a matter of honoring universal human right to peaceful assembly and freedom
of speech in a democracy. The Dalai Lama himself has not demanded a separate Tibet, and
professes non-violence. Any violent demonstrations by the Tibetan exiles in Kathmandu are not
consistent with the Dalai Lama’s view. Plus, the recent dialogue between China and the Dalai
Lama’s emissary is also an indication of a positive sign.

Likewise, Nepal should assure India that its land and the government apparatus would not be
used to aid and incite Maoist insurgency on the Indian lands. Similar assurance will have to be
extracted from the Indian side.

Historical Context
Historically, Nepal has provided a cultural linkage between Tibet and India. There are hundreds
of cave dwellings in the upper Mustang valley filled with the centuries old magnificent Hindu
and Buddhist paintings. These vast cave settlements provide evidence that the valley was
frequented by pilgrims traveling between Tibet and India. This vibrancy in the valley several
centuries ago seemed to have played a major role in spreading Buddhism in Tibet. On economic
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front, Nepal and Tibet traded salt, rugs, and spices for centuries, and Nepal used to have a strong
business presence in Lhasa. There are still several hundred Nepalis permanently settled in Tibet.
Lately, the two countries are increasingly involved in export and import of the manufacturing
goods. We already know of Nepalis and Indians sharing an age-old Vedic cultural heritage. But,
Nepal’s Himali cultural tie with the northern neighbor is also not less important.

There are thousands of Buddhist shrines, pagodas, statues in China, and some even bear Nepali
architectural influence. The world famous White Pagoda near Beijing was built in 1271 AD by a
Nepali artisan Araniko from Kathmandu. Manjushree, a revered Buddhist deity in the
Kathmandu valley, has a deep connection with Mount Wutai mountain of China. With its five
flat peaks, Mount Wutai is a sacred Buddhist mountain, and a global center for Buddhist
Manjushree worship.

There are numerous accounts of Chinese travelers coming to
Indian subcontinents and spending time learning Sanskrit and
spiritual texts, and then taking them to China for translation. An
Indian Yogi Padma Shambhawa, also known as Guru Rimpoche,
is regarded as the founder of Vajrayan Buddism in Tibet.

There are close to 100 million Buddhists in China, and about 3-5 million tourists visit Lhasa
every year. That is, there is a natural trans-boundary cultural foundation that binds the three
countries together, making a trilateral agreement more relevant between the three countries. One
can only hope that these old ties will be restarted again, and China, Nepal, and India will again
find a way to live with each other in an environment of mutual trust and respect.

Nepal as Transit Land of Opportunities

A long and narrow stretch of Nepal, with multiple transit points, provides an excellent transit
buffer to link China’s Tibetan territory and its east-west highway network with the densely
populated Indian planes of Bihar and Uttar Pradesh. With several multi-lane feeder highways
under construction linking Kathmandu with the Tarai (southern planes) towns, the traveling

distance between the northern (China)
and southern (India) borders will not be
more than 300 KM. Currently, Nepal
has a highway linking Kathmandu with a
Tibetan border town of Khasa (northeast). A second highway is being built
through

Rasuwa

district

connecting

Kathmandu and Kerung, a border town
in the north from the capital. With just a few kilometers of narrow Indian territory separating
Nepal and Bangladesh in the south-east corner of Nepal, the proposed tans-Himalayan network
can easily be connected to the ports and markets in Bangladesh. India also stands to gain much
by cooperating with Bangladesh to tap into their national highway networks to have easier access
to the north-eastern Indian territories, and perhaps beyond into Myanmar.

Nepal can be a strategic transit to help India play a role in another big game China is
orchestrating on its western frontier, also referred to as China’s new Silk Roads. As India
continues to seek opportunities around its neighborhoods, China is also making heavy
investments to make headways into the resource-laden Central Asian countries that once were
considered the buffer states. Thanks to Chinese economic muscle power and the farsighted
vision, the region of contentious flashpoints is gradually turning into a transit corridor between
East and West. Thus, politicians in Nepal too should change their old mindset, and not consider
the country as a buffer state between China and India. The proposed THECA doctrine will help
Nepal look beyond the narrow tunnel vision that is being harbored for decades.

Dissolving Mindsets

So what should Nepal do? First and foremost, Nepal’s politicians need to drop the China versus
India rhetoric from their political vocabulary and begin a fresh dialogue to design a new strategic
vision for Nepal. As stated above, in terms of economic trade and volume, India now has closer
ties with China than with Nepal or any other country in South Asia. So, Nepal’s positioning for
taking advantage of the economic growth of China should not be looked at as a precursor to a
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geopolitical avalanche. In reality, the hue and cry in political and diplomatic circle in Nepal and
India is merely a hangover psychology of the bygone days. It reminds us of the period when
even after Russia and US ended the cold war, the US continued to treat India as an ally of Soviet
Union of the cold war era. Within a span of two decades, who would have thought that India and
the US would be engaged in a joint naval exercise? Likewise, Nepal’s closeness to India need
not be interpreted as a sign of big brotherly hegemonic domination. Nepal just has to learn how
to leverage its comparative advantages. India also needs to rethink its regional diplomacy and
the way its views China and the smaller neighbors.

Moving Ahead

The key is to build a sense of trust by being respectful of each other’s national sensibilities.
Nepal cannot afford to use the China versus India card as pendulum diplomacy to suit their
domestic political game plan. Nor can they afford to sit back passively and submit to their
merciful discretion of the two giant neighbors. Time has come for Nepalis to change the
mindset, and be transparent about their needs and concerns, and take up a proactive approach to
regional diplomacy.

Given Nepal’s potential in being a busy corridor, the country needs to be environmentally
sensitive and far-sighted from the beginning and avoid building polluting motor vehicledependent highways. Instead, they should strive to go for futuristic electrically-operated highspeed train services. This may sound expensive and unrealistic at present, but it ought to be the
wave of the future. It is also worth noting that China is committed in connecting Lhasa to the
Nepal border town by extending its railway system. It only shows Chinese eagerness to link this
railway system to the Indian network on the Nepali borders with a gap of only about 300 KM inbetween.

Of course, in order to get Nepal on track for economic prosperity, the Maoists must be
completely assimilated into our political spectrum, starting foremost with a written agreement on
the merger of a mutually agreeable fixed number of PLA fighters into the Nepal Army. In
addition, two things are essential pre-conditions: 1) a semblance of some political stability in

Nepal, and 2) for the Maoists and others to tame their militant cadres against engaging in
frivolous demonstrations and disruption of economic activity that discourage both foreign direct
investment and national investment.

Given the way things are going at present, the tri-lateral treaty will require some more time,
serious homework, and a tactful shuttle diplomacy. But while the politicians are distracted, the
groundwork for the proposed THECA doctrine should begin to help break the geo-political
paranoia and economic stagnation. But a long-run success of an agreement like this will require
strong parliamentary endorsement from all the parties in Nepal, big and small.
**
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